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o.  Abstract 
Companies are under increasing pressure to  develop new products more  effectively 
and  efficiently.  In  order to  meet this  challenge,  the  organisation of  the  new product 
development process has  received  ample  attention both  in  the  academic literature 
and  in  the practitioner literature. As a consequence,  a myriad  of  methods to design 
new  products  has  been  developed.  These  methods  aim  at  facilitating  concurrent 
product design and engineering.  However,  it  is  only  recently,  through  the  advent of 
families  of  new  design technologies,  that  concurrency  really  becomes  possible.  In 
this  paper,  research  on  the  impact  of  new  design  technologies  on  the  product 
development  process  is  reported  and  discussed.  It  is  demonstrated  that  these 
technologies  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  organisation  of  innovation 
processes. 
1.  Technology and the black box of innovation 
This paper is about the ways in which companies develop technological innovations 
that become embedded into products and  processes.  More specifically,  we want to 
discuss  the  way  new  technologies  such  as  3D  CAD  systems  or  3D  prototyping 
technologies, commonly known as parametric design technologies, are  shaping and 
reconfiguring  the  organisation  of  the  innovation  process.  As  a  consequence,  this 
paper is first of all  concerned  with  innovation  operations.  Only through  an  in-depth 
understanding of  these operations  is  it  possible  to  gradually open  the  black box  of 
technology  development.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  these  operations  are 
devoid  of  strategic  significance.  We  therefore  will  conclude  the  discussion  by 
showing  how  the  integration  of  these  innovation  operations  into  an  "Integrated 
Design  Capability"  can  sustain  a  firm's  competitive  position,  and  hence,  turn 
innovation into a strategic weapon for the company. 
1.1.  Understanding technology 
Technology has always been omnipresent in  innovation  management research  and 
practice. Understanding the  genesis and the evolution of new technologies is indeed 
necessary if one  is to  open  the "black box"  of the  technological innovation  process. Technological innovation is hereby defined as the successful commercial exploitation 
of  inventions  as  they  become  embodied  into  new  products  and  processes.  The 
emphasis thus is  on  exploiting the  results of technological creativity and  activity,  by 
integrating them into products and processes. There are,  of course, different opinions 
on what constitutes a "new" technology, product or process. 
In the most pure sense, the technology, the product or the process developed is new 
to the  world. This  need  not  be  the  case,  though.  A technology,  product or process 
can  indeed  be  new  to  the  company  without  it  being  new  to  the  world.  Current 
definitions of technological  innovation even  go further by including improvements to 
existing products or processes as innovations. In  sum,  we can  and should go as far 
as considering  any product or process an  innovation  as  long  as it  is  perceived  as 
new to  the  organisations  involved,  even  though  it  may  appear  to  others  to  be  an 
"imitation" of something that exists elsewhere (Van de Ven, 1986). 
It is obvious that any company involved in innovation should be aware of this full and 
broad  spectrum  of  innovative  activity.  The  distribution  of  degrees of  newness  in  a 
firm's  innovative  endeavours  lays  at the  origins  of  the  concept  of  the  innovation 
portfolio  (Roussel,  Saad  &  Erickson,  1991).  This  variety  in  degrees of  newness  is 
important to  spot familiarity  gaps with  respect to  a firm's established expertise and 
experience base. The higher the degree of newness of an  innovation, the higher the 
chance  is  that  the  firm  lacks  some  critical  expertise  or  experience  to  make  the 
innovation successful. Hence, the higher the chance for failure and/or the higher the 
need for the firm to attract expertise and experience that is external to the firm. 
In  those  instances,  we  truly have  to  consider  make-and-buy  decisions  rather  than 
mere make-or-buy decisions, as the firm has to  internalise and to develop absorptive 
capacity to sustain this type of innovation (Debackere, Clarysse & Rappa,  1996a&b). 
For  instance,  a  software  developer  that  has  a  lifelong  expertise  and  experience 
designing  and  developing  programs  in  an  IBM  AS400  environment  may  find  it 
impossible  to  develop  a  software  package  running  on  a  UNIX  platform  solely  by 
relying on  current in-house capabilities. Just buying the  expertise  externally may be 
insufficient, as the  developer will  have to  gain fluency and  experience with  the  new 
programming  environment  if  it  truly  wants  to  integrate  UNIX  in  its  product  range. 
Hence,  the  buy  decision  needs to  complement  rather than  to  substitute  the  make 
decision.  Along  similar lines,  banks that have  developed  a wide  array  of  software 
applications  in  the  by  now traditional  COBOL  environment will  face  at  least  some 
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programming. 
At the same time, this need for new capabilities is often offset by the inertia emerging 
from  the  firm's  established  skill  base  (Debackere,  Clarysse  &  Rappa,  1996c; 
Henderson  & Clark,  1990; Katz & Allen,  1982). This  inertia operates not only at the 
level of organisational routines, but also in the minds, beliefs and search heuristics of 
the practitioners shaping technological progress. These  practitioners,  engineers and 
scientists,  are  at  the  basis  of  the  existence  of  communities  of  practitioners  that 
create,  shape,  but also inhibit, technological development as  they  build  momentum 
and at the same time generate inertia (Constant, 1980; Debackere & Rappa, 1994). 
Moreover, the "newness" of an innovation may not only enhance but can also disrupt 
the  firm's  current  technical  and  market  capabilities  as  well  as  its  established 
relationships  with  professional  communities  and  supplier/customer  communities 
(Abernathy  & Clark,  1985). This distinguishes innovation  management from  quality 
management as the latter one is geared toward continuous improvement.  Innovation 
management is not only about managing improvement via continuity, but also about 
managing  discontinuous  change  within  the  firm  in  order  to  sustain  the  (future) 
continuity of the firm. "Newness" therefore introduces risk,  uncertainty and ambiguity 
at  various  levels  depending  on  the  very  nature  of  newness  itself.  Managing 
innovation therefore boils down to managing and coping with newness, including the 
inherent uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The  Cyclone  Converter  Furnace  (CCF)  developed  by  Koninklijke  Hoogovens  is  a 
good  example  of  an  innovation  that  disrupts  existing  competencies.  The  CCF 
process is  a two-stage process that consists of pre-reduction and  pre-melting of  ore 
in  a melting cyclone followed by final  reduction in  a converter type vessel containing 
a liquid  iron  bath.  Both  stages of the process are  combined in  a single reactor. The 
CCF  produces  hot metal  directly from the  raw  materials.  The  carbonisation  of  coal 
and  the  agglomerations of ores are  no  longer required  (Meijer,  Flierman, Teerhuis, 
Bernard & Boom,  1995). This process, once fully operational, will  put an  end  to  the 
"thousand-year"  realm  of  the  blast  furnace.  For  a  company  named  "Koninklijke 
Hoogovens" (literal translation: Royal Blast Furnaces), this example illustrates all too 
well  what  I  mean  by  competence  disruption.  It  does  not  only  mean  changing 
competencies but also, at least to some extent, changing identity. And,  it  must be  a 
very  strong  organisation  that  is  able  to  violate  and  to  replace  its  well-established 
routines. 
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challenges an  organisation will  experience to  turn  the  innovation  into a commercial 
success.  Both  the acquisition and the development of  organisational capabilities as 
well  as grasping the  ''fit''  between  the  innovation  and  its  context of  use,  take  on  a 
more demanding perspective  in  the face  of  competence  disrupting  innovations.  As 
we will see later on in this paper, introducing new design technologies to sustain the 
innovation  process  most often  has  a  similar  disruptive  impact  on  the  established 
design and development practice  in  many organisations.  But,  before turning  to this 
design revolution, let us first have a look at the nature of the process of technological 
product creation. 
1.2. The design hierarchy: managing "form" and "context" 
At the roots  of  each  new product development lies  a design  hierarchy,  including  a 
technology tree (e.g. Clark, 1985; lansiti, 1997; Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995). This design 
hierarchy does not come about at random.  It is the  result of two  related processes. 
The first process reflects the logic of technical problem solving in product design (e.g. 
Allen  &  Frischmuth,  1969; Petroski,  1996; Weber and  Perkins,  1992). The  second 
process is the formation of product concepts that underpin and fulfil customer needs 
(e.g.  Cooper,  1993;  Cooper  &  Kleinschmidt,  1996;  ReVelle,  Moran  &  Cox,  1998; 
Souder, 1987; Thomas, 1993; von Hippel, 1988). The presence and the interaction of 
both processes impose a hierarchical structure on product-technology evolutions. 
The presence of a design hierarchy is thus at least partly due to the internal (problem 
solving)  logic  of  the  design  itself.  As  suggested  by  Petroski  in  his  1996  book 
"Invention by Design", design is a process of understanding what the product's form 
is  and  how  it  might ''fit''  the  context  in  which  it  is  to  function.  The  outcome  of  the 
design process is the result of cycles of experimentation and analysis that gradually 
define and refine the form of the product. Components are identified, major systems 
and  sub-systems  are  conceptualised  and  chosen,  and  their  interrelationships  are 
examined.  Physical,  chemical,  mechanical,  electrical  and  other engineering  "laws" 
impose specific constraints on  the form of the  design hierarchy, which can  therefore 
be  conceptualised  as  a  "decision"  tree.  This  form  of  the  product  can  further  be 
thought  of  as  a  set  of  technical  specifications  and  requirements  (Gevirtz,  1994; 
ReVelle, Moran & Cox, 1998). 
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concepts for functional  parameters that  result  in  a form  that "fits" the  context well. 
Goodness of  fit  between  form  and  context therefore  is  at  the  heart of  the  second 
process shaping a design hierarchy. The  "fit" of  the product form  with  its  context  is 
most  often  conceptualised  as  a  set  of  functional  specifications  or  requirements 
(Gevirtz, 1994; ReVelle, Moran & Cox,  1998). As we will see later on,  methodologies 
like  Quality Function  Deployment attempt at  aligning form  and  context precisely by 
linking those technical and functional parameters (Bossert, 1991; Hauser & Clausing, 
1988; Debackere, Van Looy and Vliegen, 1997). Thus, the cycles of experimentation 
and analysis referred to previously are necessary to develop a "form" that is  aligned 
to its "context of use." 
A cellular phone  is  the outcome  of  the  integration  of  many  different technologies, 
embodied in  components and  subassemblies that are  ultimately assembled  into the 
by now familiar phone set. The Bill-of-Material of a cellular phone is perhaps the most 
visible  and  tangible  outcome  of  a design  hierarchy  that  captures  the  "form"  of  the 
product. However, from an  innovation perspective, "form" alone is not sufficient. The 
form is based on technical parameters that should fit the context of use, as described 
by the product's functional parameters. 
In  the  example  of  a  cellular phone,  some  relevant  functional  parameters  are:  the 
weight of the phone, its volume and dimensions, the price of the phone,  its memory 
size,  the  voice  mail  functionality,  the  positioning  of  the  phone  ("business"  versus 
"consumer"), the battery performance, and the design aesthetics of the phone. These 
functional parameters define the context of use of the phone. Besides delineating the 
functional parameter space, it is critical to define the value of those parameters once 
this space is defined. Both the definition of the parameter space and the assessment 
of the target values of the functional parameters define the fit of  the  product form to 
its context of use. 
However,  in  defining  those  functional  parameters,  we  have  to  take  into  account 
technical constraints as  they emerge from  physical  and  engineering  limitations.  For 
instance, the functional parameters like weight, volume and  price will  be  determined 
by  technical parameters such  as  the  number and  the  type  of  discrete components 
used  the  technical  parameters  for  EMI  (radiation)  shielding,  the  technical 
characteristics of the battery pack, etc.  Aligning form to context thus implies aligning 
functional and technical requirements. As has been argued  many times (e.g.  Twiss, 
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sequential  process.  But,  most often  it  is  the  result  of  a coupled  process  in  which 
different groups within  the company and even  outside the  company have to  interact 
and to  iterate. This iterative process is at the origins of the design hierarchy referred 
to at the beginning of this section: starting from a high level design to iterate toward a 
more  detailed  level  design  including  subassemblies,  subcomponents  and  basic 
design parts. As I will explain in  more detail later on, the specific details of this design 
hierarchy are filled out during cycles of experimentation and analysis. 
Of  course,  when referring  to  cellular phones,  product technology is  just one  half  of 
the technological Janus face. Process technology is the other half. The components, 
subassemblies and final  assemblies all  need  to  be  manufactured  in  a timely and  a 
cost-effective manner (Kalpakjian, 1995). It is obvious that the process requirements 
and limitations also have an impact on the development of the design hierarchy just 
described. As a consequence, product and process technology have to  be taken into 
account in fitting form to context, thus further increasing the complexity of the product 
design.  Because  of  this  complexity,  both  product  and  process  data  management 
have  become  increasingly  important  in  the  design  and  the  development  of  new 
products.  Software  technologies  to  manage  libraries  of  product  and  process  data 
(e.g. the CADIM software) therefore become an increasingly important support tool in 
designing new products. As  suggested by Abemathy and Utterback in their dynamic 
model of product and process innovation (1978) as well  as by Van de Ven  (1986) in 
his  coupled  model  of  the  innovation  process,  there  not  only  has  to  be  an  intimate 
coupling between product "form" and "context of use," but also between product and 
process parameters. 
1.3.  Uncertainty and ambiguity: mediating the "fit" between form and context 
In fitting '~orm" to "context," ambiguity and uncertainty playa central role (Debackere, 
1998;  Schrader,  Riggs  & Smith,  1993;  Van  Looy,  Debackere  &  Bouwen,  1999). 
Although both concepts are  related,  they are  not completely overlapping.  Ambiguity 
and  uncertainty,  therefore,  both  playa distinct  role  in  designing  and  developing 
products and product applications.  However, this distinctive role  has been to a large 
extent  neglected  in  the  many  models  that  provide  guidance  in  managing  the 
innovation process. 
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conceptual  models and  techniques that attempt at providing insights to manage the 
innovation process.  Uncertainty is  characteristic of a situation  in  which the  problem 
solver considers the structure of the problem (including the set of relevant variables) 
as  given,  but  is  dissatisfied  with  the  knowledge  available  of  the  value  of  these 
variables. 
This  is  in  line  with  both  information  theory  and  decision  theory  that  have  defined 
uncertainty as characteristic of situations where the set of possible future outcomes 
is  identified, but where the  related  probability distributions are  unknown,  or at best 
known subjectively. Decision theory also defines the concept of risk as a special case 
of uncertainty. That is, risk is uncertainty with known probabilities. 
Research on  organisations has broadened those  definitions to fit the  organisational 
context.  Galbraith  (1973)  defines  uncertainty  as  the  difference  between  the 
information an organisation has and the information it needs. This coincides with the 
early definitions of uncertainty provided by researchers on the psychology of problem 
solving  (e.g.  Miller  &  Frick,  1949),  as  derived  from  the  mathematical  theory  of 
communication  (Shannon  & Weaver,  1949).  Duncan  (1972)  defines  uncertainty as 
follows: 
"(1)  The  lack  of  information  regarding  environmental  factors 
associated with  a given decision-making situation,  (2)  not knowing 
the  outcome  of  a specific  decision  in  terms  of  not  knowing  how 
much  the  organisation  would  lose  if  the  decision  were  incorrect, 
and  (3)  inability  to  assign  probabilities  with  any  degree  of 
confidence  with  regard  to  how environmental factors are  going  to 
affect the  success  or failure  of  the  decision  unit  in  performing  its 
function." 
The first two components are quite similar to the broad definition by Galbraith (1973), 
while the  third  component is  similar to  the more  narrow definitions  that stem  from 
information and  decision theory.  The  common  theme  behind  all  those definitions is 
that  uncertainty  is  related  to  asymmetric and  lack  of  information.  Consequently,  if 
problem  solvers  want  to  reduce  uncertainty,  they  should  gather  information  on 
variables that are known to them. 
This finding then has been at the heart of many models and instruments designed to 
manage  the  innovation  process,  which  is  in  essence  a  process  of  uncertainty 
reduction through problem solving activity (Allen,  1977; Brown  & Eisenhardt, 1995). 
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need  for  cross-functional  integration  and  information  exchange  during  innovation 
endeavours (Allen, 1977; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). Effective uncertainty reduction 
imposes a need for reducing information asymmetries between the different partners 
involved  in  the  innovation  endeavour  (suppliers,  customers,  beholders  of 
complementary  assets,  and  the  different  intra-company functional  groups  such  as 
R&D, marketing and manufacturing). 
However, there  are some  limitations to this approach as well.  Several authors have 
argued  that  models  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  often  do  not  describe 
adequately real-world decision making (e.g.  March, 1978; Daft & Lengel, 1986). They 
propose that often possible future outcomes are not identified or well defined and that 
there may be conflict with regard to what these will or should be. These authors state 
that decision-making and  problem  solving  are  often  carried  out under conditions of 
ambiguity,  rather  than  uncertainty,  where  ambiguity  is  defined  as  lack  of  clarity 
regarding the  relevant variables and their functional  relationships.  Ambiguity relates 
directly to  Daft and Lengel's notion  (1986)  of  equivocality,  which  they define as  "  ... 
ambiguity, the existence of  multiple and conflicting interpretations about a situation." 
Allen already alluded to  this in  his 1977 book, when  he  explains why direct face-to-
face contact is the most effective information channel  in  innovation settings.  It  is,  he 
argues, because face-to-face contact does not only help to reduce uncertainty via the 
sharing of information, but more important still, face-to-face contact makes it easier to 
unveil and discuss divergences in  interpretation on  the  information  being  shared.  In 
other words,  in  an  innovation context,  we  do not only have to  consider situations of 
asymmetric  information,  but  also,  situations  of  asymmetric  interpretation  of 
information.  In  order to  reduce  asymmetries  in  interpretation,  the  richness  of  the 
information and information channels available therefore are of crucial importance. 
As  we  all  know,  face-to-face  information  exchange  carries  a  high  level  of  media 
richness. As  I will  argue  later on,  three-dimensional parametric representations and 
models of product designs also carry a higher level of information richness than their 
traditional  two-dimensional  representations  on  calculation  sheets  and  paper 
drawings.  And,  this  is  precisely where  the  design  technology  revolution  comes  in. 
Today,  an  increasing  amount of  technology  is  becoming  available  that  allows  for 
quick experiential  design  and  development of  three-dimensional  representations  of 
product forms. This implies that in fitting form to context of  use via the development 
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quickly define three-dimensional forms of the  product (either on  computer screen as 
happens  with  three-dimensional  CAD  systems  such  as  CATIA,  ProEngineer  and 
Unigraphics or in  hard models as happens with three-dimensional Rapid Prototyping 
technologies such as stereolithography and selective laser sintering). 
These experiential forms can then be confronted with various stakeholders belonging 
to the context of use.  In  doing so,  it becomes possible to define a new product form 
in  a  very  experiential  mode,  consisting  of  cycles  of  iteration  based  on  "real" 
representations  of  the  product  form.  Moreover,  taking  into  account  the  potential 
impact of  new design  technologies is  also  important to  introduce and  to  emphasise 
the  role  of  experiments during  the  innovation  process.  Many  writings  on  managing 
the innovation process have almost exclusively focused on the issues of information 
and  information  exchange  (see  for  instance  the  management  of  part-whole 
relationships  as  described  by Van  de  Ven,  1986).  However,  as  observed  by  Allen 
(1977), information exchange is (notwithstanding its importance), only a smaller part 
of the total activity of  product designers and  engineers.  In  Table 1,  I summarise the 
activity  patterns  of  designers  and  engineers  in  innovation  projects  as  Tom  Allen 
observed them. 
Table 1: The importance of experiments during product design and development (Allen,  1977) 
Source of time allocation  Percentage of total time allocated across 12 
projects 
Analysis and experimentation  77.3% 
Literature use  7.9% 
All communication (including literature)  16.4 % 
Other activity  6.4% 
Total time reported (man-hours)  20,185 hours 
As is clear from Table 1, analysis and experimentation make up for about 77% of the 
activity pattern of the deSigners and engineers involved in  design and development. 
Sofar,  we  have  largely  neglected the  organisation  of  these  77%  in  the  context  of 
innovation management. If we  want to arrive at a more  effective and efficient design 
and  development process,  we thus  will  have  to  better handle  and  understand the 
management of  these  analyses  and  experiments.  In  a  very  interesting  and  recent 
paper,  Eisenhardt  and  Tabrizi  (1995)  argue  that  in  complex  product  development 
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management  fails  and  should  be  replaced  by  experiential  project  management, 
consisting of a rapid sequence of design-build-test-redesign cycles. 
This  is  precisely  at  the  heart  of  the  argument  I  want  to  make  in  this  paper:  in 
situations of high levels of ambiguity, when defining and designing a product form to 
fit the context of use, we will  have to bring in modes of managing innovation projects 
that  explicitly  recognise  the  value  and  the  contribution  of  experimentation  and 
analysis. This however implies that we can  arrive at experimentation  strategies that 
move  beyond  mere  trial  and  error  experimentation.  This  is  where  the  new design 
technologies come in as an integral part of managing the innovation process. 
It is therefore the central thesis of this paper that these design technologies (I tend to 
call  them  meta-technologies  or  technologies  to  develop  technology)  add  a  new 
element to the  management of  the  innovation process as  they explicitly allow us  to 
better manage cycles of experimentation in product definition and design to cope with 
both ambiguity and uncertainty. Ambiguity is thereby linked to reducing differences in 
interpretation on the product form (for instance, on the definition of the relevant space 
of functional parameters), while uncertainty is  linked to  arriving  at acceptable target 
values  for  the  chosen  functional  parameters  via  the  reduction  of  differences  in 
information on the context of use of the product form. 
In  other  words,  bringing  in  both  ambiguity  and  uncertainty  enables  us  to  start 
managing  more  actively  both  product  form  definition  (which  is  about  the  correct 
definition of the  "problem" the  product is  about to  solve) and  product form  creation 
(which  is  about  solving  the  problems  in  order  to  successfully  reduce  the  product 
definition  to  practice).  In  other  words,  we  need  a  more  intimate  linkage  between 
Droduct definition and product creation. Or,  as designers and developers often state: 
>nce  you have defined the problem you want to  solve, you have solved it." And, the 
pecific way to manage this intimate linkage between problem definition and problem 
solution  is  via  the  effective  management of  analysis  and  experimentation.  This  is 
where the  new  design technologies  start perhaps  slowly  but firmly occupying  their 
place and space in the innovation environment of the firm. 
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Decades of research  into the  management of  innovation processes have  led  to the 
discovery of fundamental  critical  success factors  (for a good  summary overview,  I 
refer to Tidd, Bessant & Pavitt, 1997). In order to revisit them from the perspective of 
the impact of new design technologies, they are now briefly summarised. 
2.1. Explaining the core of innovation performance 
In  Figure  1,  I  provide  a  (simplified)  summary  overview  of  the  key  performance 
variables  relevant  for  the  innovation  process  at  the  operational  level.  The  critical 
influence  of  information  flows  and  communication  pattems  on  the  performance  of 
innovation  activities  has  been  well-documented  and  subject  to  major  research 
attention (see Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995, for an  excellent overview of the different 
research  studies  on  this  topic).  These  flows  are  at  the  heart  of  the  summary 
performance  model.  The  attention  paid  to  information  flows  and  communication 
networks  is  not  astonishing  given  the  need  for  uncertainty  reduction  during  the 
innovation process, as described in the previous section. As Tom Allen noticed in  his 
early  work  (1977):  information  is  the  primary  input  into  any  process  of  uncertainty 
reduction. 
Not  only  is  there  a  need  for  intense  intra-organisational  and  cross-functional 
information flows and communication patterns during the innovation process; but, also 
for  the  innovative  organisation  to  be  well  embedded  and  linked  to  its  broader 
(external)  technological  environment.  This  embeddedness  is  symbolised  by  the 
presence of special 'network' roles during the innovation process, amongst which the 
gatekeeper figures prominently (Allen, 1977). Related studies that have their origins in 
the  development  and  the  marketing  of  new  products  have  further  pointed  to  the 
importance of: 
(1)  appropriate modes of work organisation (amongst which project structures figure 
predominant), and 
(2)  design methodologies (such as Quality Function Deployment), 
in  order to  achieve a high performing  innovation  process  (Cooper,  1993;  Crawford, 
1983; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). 
The methodological avenues that have received ample attention include: 
11 •  the  use  of  flowchart-based  decision  and  monitoring  models  of  the  innovation 
process  (e.g.  the  phase models and  stage-gate models as  described in  Souder, 
1987 or  in  Twiss,  1994) taking  into  account both  the fuzzy front  end  phase  of 
every innovation endeavour as well  as the need for learning between projects as 
manifested by the presence of a "post"-project phase  (Debackere & Vandevelde, 
1996; Deschamps & Nayak, 1995); 
•  the  introduction  of  creativity-stimulating  and  idea-generating  techniques  like 
brainstorming  and  mind-mapping  (e.g.  Povel,  1993,  Terninko,  Zusman  & Zlotin, 
1998); 
•  the use and the design of grid-methodologies and techniques to identify, to  define 
and to  monitor innovation opportunities (e.g.  swot-assessments, product maturity 
grids,  business growth  matrices,  quality function  deployment matrices;  I refer to 
Clark  &  Fujimoto  (1991)  as  well  as  Wheelwright  &  Clark  (1992)  for  a  good 
overview); 
•  the development of selection methodologies that respond to the innovation's need 
for funnelling,  i.e. filtering and tunnelling a wealth  of ideas into a more limited set 
of new product-technology concepts toward a still  more limited set of "successful" 
products  (for  an  excellent  overview  of  the  funnelling  concept,  I  refer  to 
Wheelwright & Clark, 1992); 
•  the  application  of  project  management  techniques  to  follow-up  on  innovation 
endeavours (see for instance Duncan, 1996). 
The  interaction  and  co-evolution  of  work  organisation,  design  methodologies  and 
information  flows  are  at  the  very  heart  of  the  operational  management  of  the 
innovation process. As can be seen from Figure 1, the advent of design technologies 
such  as tree-dimensional  computer aided  design  systems and  rapid  prototyping  as 
well  as rapid tooling  techniques adds  yet another dimension to the  heart of a high-
performing  innovation  process.  As  argued  in  the  previous  sections,  the  advent  of 
these technologies has a dramatic impact on the principles of concurrency and time-
compression that at the  moment  represent a  key  trend  in  the  management of  new 
product development processes (Loch & Terwiesch, 1998). 
They  are  instrumental  in  making  "experimentation"  a  central  activity  during  any 
innovation  process.  By  their  very  nature,  the  new  design  technologies  assist  to 
integrate  the  new  product  development  process  to  allow  participants  making 
12 upstream decisions to consider downstream and external requirements,  including the 
timely and relevant involvement of downstream and external decision makers. 
Information flows  are  mediated  and  supported  by  an  appropriate  work-organisation 
format and design  methodology.  However,  in  order for these  modes  of organisation 
and design methods to be  deployed successfully, the  necessary informal as  well  as 
formal  information  flows  and  communication  patterns  have  to  be  put in  place  and 
have  to  be  sustained.  Hence,  there  is  an  immediate,  two-way  interaction  between 
structural variables such as organisation, design methodology and  design technology 
on the one hand and information flows on the other hand. This two-way interaction is 
at the heart of the  process of ambiguity and  uncertainty reduction  discussed earlier 
on. This two-way interaction  is  at the heart of what I will  call  later on  the "Integrated 
Design Capability" of the innovative firm. 
13 Figure 1: An integrated model of innovation project performance 
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14 2.2. Innovation performance as a multidimensional concept 
As  further  shown  in  Figure  1,  innovation  performance  is  a  complex  and  multi-
dimensional construct.  Performance  relates  to  such  rational,  financial  indicators  as 
market shares and revenues that accrue from  innovative activities,  However,  market 
shares and  revenues only present one dimension  of the  performance concept. The 
second  route  toward  measuring  performance  refers to  the  internal  efficiency of  the 
innovation  process,  It  considers  the  extent  to  which  the  innovation  process  is 
efficiently  managed  in  terms  of,  for  instance,  throughput  times  during  the  various 
phases  of  the  innovation  trajectory  (e.g.,  time-to-concept,  experimental  problem-
solving cycle times, time-to-ramp-up). A third type of performance dimension  relates 
to perceptual measures as the innovation's contribution to the strategic mission of the 
organisation. 
It  is  important that we  accept the  multidimensionality of the  performance  construct. 
Early studies  on  innovation performance  have  indeed  focused  quite  heavily on  the 
market and financial performance indicators.  Even today,  many project management 
techniques  that  are  used  to  follow-up  on  innovation  projects  still  use  this  rather 
monolithic approach.  In  an  era  where the  capability to  quickly learn from failure and 
experimentation  is  probably  one  of  the  hallmark  characteristics  of  successful 
innovators,  the  traditional,  rational  performance  approach  may be  dangerous,  as  it 
tends to focus on single-loop learning rather than double-loop learning. 
2.3. Antecedents of  innovation performance 
The  above  dimensions  of  innovative  performance  (often  operationalised  at  the 
project-level and aggregated at the portfolio-level) are influenced and leveraged by a 
myriad of parameters, as is further shown  in  Figure 1. As  mentioned, communication 
patterns,  information flows,  and  work organisation techniques are  at the  core  of  this 
framework. In addition, there are important roles to be assumed. 
Senior management attitude and commitment, project leader traits and behaviour, as 
well  as team member characteristics exert a strong influence on  the  performance of 
innovation  activities.  Moreover,  these  have  to  be  embedded  in  an  appropriate 
motivational  context,  using  incentive  mechanisms  that  foster  "project  ownership" 
rather than "performance control."  Incentive  mechanisms fostering  entrepreneurship 
and  "ownership"  in  innovative  contexts  therefore  have  to  be  related  to  the  project 
process  (Philips  goes  as  far  as  calling  the  project  process  a  Business  Creation 
15 Process rather than a Product Creation Process) as well as to  the overall success of 
the project in  the eyes of its customer (e.g., by providing substantive bonus-schemes 
for the  project members  if  they  achieve  a  successful  project  result).  Of  course,  as 
suggested in  Figure  1,  the  complexity of the  project (research versus breakthrough, 
platform  or  derivative  as  defined  by Wheelwright & Clark,  1992)  has  an  important 
impact on the relationships just described. More specifically, in the case of derivative 
or incremental projects, these performance relationships can  be  managed in  a much 
more  structured  and  formalised  way  than  in  the  case  of  a  research  activity  or a 
breakthrough project. For instance, in a breakthrough project, creating ownership may 
involve  the  development  of  highly  visible  bonus  schemes  that  give  the  project 
members  significant  stakes  in  the  project's  success.  For  derivative  projects  this 
should  not  be  the  case.  Here  the  incentive  system  should  evaluate  such  'classic' 
performance  control  criteria  as  responsiveness  and  timeliness  of  the  project 
members' activities. 
The involvement of extemal parties, more specifically suppliers and customers, is yet 
another  well-known  determinant  of  innovation  success  (see  for  instance  Eric  von 
Hippel's research on the role of lead users during the innovation process (1988)). The 
relative  importance  of  their  impact  varies  depending  on  the  party  that  obtains  the 
highest returns from  investing  in  the  innovation. Although this  is a simple criterion, it 
may be  hard to  realise  who  will  benefit most from  a particular innovation,  certainly 
when it pertains to emerging technologies and industries. 
For  example,  the  telecommunications  industry  is  in  full  flux.  Product  and  service 
innovations are increasingly intertwined and have a dramatic impact on  our daily life. 
However, it is unclear so far who  will  reap the  most benefits from those innovations. 
Five years ago,  MCI was a big  innovator in the industry. Today,  it has been acquired 
bv WorldCom, which  is  much smaller than  MCI  but is  now one  of the most admired 
service innovators in the industry. However, it is still not clear whether a company like 
WorldCom  will  ultimately  be  able  to  reap  the  benefits  from  those  innovations,  or 
whether  they  will  accrue  to  another  as  yet  unknown  player  in  the  industry.  For 
instance, what about "traditional" telecom companies like Lucent and Alcatel? Hence, 
it  is  only  when  the  "new"  constellation  of  added  values  due  resulting  from  the 
innovation  can  be  articulated,  that we  can  start analysing  who  should benefit most 
from  involvement  in  the  innovation  process.  In  emerging  industries,  this  value 
constellation is  most often  unclear,  and hence  the  relative  importance of  users and 
suppliers is difficult to establish. 
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the  marketplace  are  other  important  parameters  influencing  success  along  the 
innovation  journey.  Turbulent  market  structures,  marked  by  high  degrees  of 
monopolistic  competition,  strongly  moderate  the  "optimal"  organisation  of  the 
innovation  process.  Examples  abound,  such  as  the  case  of  Quantum  Corporation. 
Quantum, active  in  the  area  of  computer disk drives,  experienced  a  turbulent,  fast-
evolving  marketplace with fierce  competition based on  slightly differentiated product 
characteristics. 
This  competitive  environment  necessitated  an  innovation  function  that  is  highly 
responsive to frequent changes in the marketplace. As a solution, Quantum based the 
organisation  of  its  innovation  process  on  flexible  lateral  (team-based)  structures, 
state-of-the-art functions or competencies, and appropriate incentive systems. These 
required each team member to act as a "cross-functional specialist" (which of course 
may seem like a contradiction in terminis). As those "cross-functional specialists" had 
to strike a balance between team performance versus individual performance as well 
as between expertise and experience, appropriate incentive systems were developed 
and implemented. 
This  need  for  "cross-functional  specialists"  points  to  the  dilemma  or  the  tension 
present in  the innovation matrix; an  organisational tension which  is characteristic of 
most  innovative  companies.  Any  innovator  needs  to  balance  the  development  of 
competencies  (i.e.  the  development  of  a  sufficient  absorptive  capability)  with  the 
imperative  to  achieve  the  results  expected  from  the  projects  and  programs  in  the 
portfolio. Creating a matrix form of organisation structure, in which competence areas 
and  project teams  are  intertwined  and  balanced,  often  captures  this  dilemma.  As 
shown in  Table 2,  the successful  innovation organisation requires a matrix structure 
balancing  a  clear  division  of  influence,  power  and  authority  between  its  project 
management component and its competence management component. 
In  order for  competencies  to  be  allocated  to  and  deployed  in  a  breakthrough  or 
platform  project,  they  need  to  be  up-to-date  and  state-of-the-art  (we  intentionally 
leave out derivative projects,  since they often  require  only minimal forms of  project 
organisation). Hence, successful breakthrough and platform projects will  have to  be 
embedded in  strongly developed competence areas.  This calls for a "strong" matrix 
structure,  where  competence  areas  and  project  management  both  are  allies  in 
resource accumulation and deployment, rather than  the one being dominated by the 
17 other.  Both  components  of  the  matrix  structure  have  to  be  state-of-the-art  in  their 
respective domains of  expertise and  experience.  It  is  obvious that this  presence  of 
two strong components carries the germs for a situation of conflict. 
Table 2:  Project performance in the innovation matrix (Adapted from Katz & Allen, 1985) 
Locus of decision-making on  Locus of decision-making on competence issues 
organisational issues  project management dominates  competence management 
competence management  dominates project management 
project management dominates 
competence management  moderately positive performance  strongly positive performance 
competence management 
dominates project management  average performance  strongly negative performance 
This, though, need not be a problem since a "strong" matrix certainly is  not free from 
conflicts between its project and the competence  components.  But,  what a "strong" 
matrix  certainly  does  have,  is  an  ability  to  solve  those  conflicts.  In  other  words, 
"strong"-matrix forms of  organisations handle the  tensions that occur between their 
competence  and  project  components  not  by  being  conflict-free,  but  through  their 
ability  to  manage  and  resolve  the  conflicts  that  inevitably  occur.  This  is  a  critical 
capability in  managing innovation matrices.  Certain  companies,  such  as  Intel,  have 
become very good at it. 
This  argument is further corroborated  by the  research  results  reported  in  Table  2. 
Two major dimensions that relate to decision-making in an  innovation matrix have to 
be dealt with.  First of  all,  decisions about competence issues will  have to  be  made. 
These  are,  for  instance,  decisions  relating  to  technical  issues  such  as  the 
telecommunication protocol to be  used in  the  development of  a new  product. Will  it 
be  the  Internet protocol  TCP/IP  or not?  Second,  decisions  have  to  be  made  with 
respect  to  organisational  or  managerial  issues.  These  decisions  pertain  to  such 
questions and  topics as  the  allocation of  (additional)  resources  to  a  project or the 
evaluation of the performance of project team members. 
For each of those decision areas, we have to ask what should be the most influential 
component. Should it be the competence component of the organisation, or should it 
be the project component? The summary research  results reported  in  Table 2 show 
that  the  highest performance  is  obtained  when  a balance is  realised  between  the 
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organisational/managerial  decision-making;  while  the  competence  component 
dominates  competence-related  or  technical  decision-making.  The  lowest 
performance  occurs  when  the  competence  component  dominates  both 
organisational/managerial  decision-making  on  the  project  and  technical  decision-
making on  the project.  In  the  other instances (see Table 2),  project performance  is 
average or moderately positive. 
Thus, the tension  in  the  innovation  matrix calls for competencies and  projects to  be 
both  well  managed and  state-of-the-art,  instead  of  one  "unilaterally" dominating the 
other.  Unfortunately,  since  organisations  have  (and  always  will  have)  limited 
resources  available,  this  important finding  is  often  obscured.  Very  often,  the  finite 
capacity problem  is  solved  by allowing  one  component  in  the  innovation  matrix  to 
gain complete control over the other component on both dimensions of the decision-
making process. This, however, leads to  sub-optimal performance as  demonstrated 
in Table 2. 
Still  worse,  all  too  often  the  finite  capacity constraints are  resolved  by  making  the 
traditional  functional  (i.e.  the  competence  based)  organisation  dominate  decision-
making along both dimensions. As is demonstrated in Table 2,  this is the worst case 
scenario. Typically,  in  such a situation,  it becomes impossible to  grow and  to retain 
strong project management skills and  leadership. The overall  result is  an  innovation 
project management function that underperforms and does not achieve its objectives 
in terms of strategic support to the growth of the company. 
3. Boeing: a case study on the use of technologies to develop technology 
Boeing has received much attention as an  example of the application of new design 
technologies  (Sabbagh,  1996).  Throughout  its  history,  the  company  has 
demonstrated a capability for both product and process innovation that turns it into an 
interesting case study subject, either as  a pioneer or a follower.  Boeing is  known for 
the rigor with  which  it has come to  apply project management principles throughout 
its  development and  manufacturing  process.  As  it  comes  to  product  development, 
Boeing  is  reputable  for  designing  platforms  or  families  of  aircraft.  This  design 
flexibility allowed for several variations, drawing on the same base airframe concepts. 
Modifications  such  as  a  stretched  fuselage  to  increase  capacity  can  thus  be 
accommodated without wholesale revisions in  design or the need to  start up entirely 
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co-development and outsourcing  relationships.  More  recent,  Boeing  became a  role 
model in  applying concurrent engineering principles and new design technologies to 
the design and development of the 777 aeroplane. 
3.1.  Gearing up far a (r)evalutian in aircraft design: setting the stage far the 777 
Like  many  inventions,  the  turbojet  aeroplane  engine  was  developed  more  or less 
simultaneously  and  independently  by  different  individuals  in  different  parts  of  the 
world  (Constant,  1980).  This  simultaneous  character  of  the  inventive  process  has 
been  well  documented  (for an  excellent  insight,  I refer to  Merton's discussions on 
singletons and multiples in  scientific discovery). In  England, Frank Whittle developed 
the idea of  using jet propulsion  in  aircraft and applied for his first patent in  1930.  In 
Germany,  almost simultaneously,  another researcher,  Hans  von  Ohain,  started his 
development work on jet propulsion. The  result of their efforts was the emergence of 
the  jet aircraft at the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  Communities  of  practitioners 
emerged and coalesced on the design and further development of the turbojet engine 
(Constant,  1980).  It  is  interesting to note that,  in  1991, Whittle and  von  Ohain were 
the second recipients of the  prestigious Draper Prize by the  United States'  National 
Academy of  Engineering for their contribution to  modern  aircraft development. The 
first  Draper  Prize  was awarded  in  1989 to  Jack  Kilby  and  Robert  Noyce  for their 
independent roles in inventing and developing the integrated circuit (Petroski, 1996). 
Because of Germany's post-war economic problems, the turbojet aircraft first took off 
in the  United Kingdom. During the 1950s, turbojet aircraft suffered fatal failures. This 
triggered a serious investigation of the  plane's design.  At  first,  pilot errors  and bad 
weather were  considered  the  major culprits.  However,  in  the  end  the  cause  was 
identified as metal fatigue. This was a new phenomenon in aircraft. 
Before the introduction of jets, aeroplanes did not fly so high and thus did not have to 
be  so  highly pressurised for passenger comfort.  In  order to  gain  the fuel  efficiency 
that gave the new engine part of its advantage, jets had to fly higher than  propeller-
driven aircraft. As they did, the structural components of the aircraft were subjected 
to  conditions  that  were  beyond  the  experience  of  its  deSigners.  Previously,  metal 
fatigue  was  believed  to  affect  only  machine  parts  that  were  subjected  to  cycles 
numbering  in  the  thousands,  or even  millions.  Therefore,  aircraft engineers did  not 
believe that fatigue would affect a plane, as it would be subjected to many less cycles 
20 during its lifetime. However, the aeroplane fuselage, as it alternates between no net 
pressure difference when the plane is on the ground and a net internal pressure as it 
flies at high altitude, is subject to fatigue. 
As  it  took  quite  some  time  to  the  engineering  community  to  figure  out  these 
problems,  planes  lost  the  confidence  of  the  flying  public.  As  a  consequence,  the 
British  aircraft  industry  lost  its  advantage  and  other  companies,  especially  in  the 
United  States,  began  to  develop  their  own  aircraft  models.  Boeing,  Lockheed, 
McDonnell  and  Douglas  (later  McDonnell-Douglas)  were  the  major  players.  The 
American aircraft engineers got a head start as they learned from the failure of their 
British colleagues. Over the years, the Boeing company came to  dominate the world 
market for commercial jet aircraft. This competitive advantage was mainly due to  its 
highly  reliable 707 plane  (Petroski,  1996;  Sabbagh,  1996).  As  air travel  increased 
and  as fuel  prices became a  significant fraction  in  the  operating  cost  of  airlines,  a 
variety of competing commercial jet aircraft emerged. 
As  early as the  mid-1970s, the European  Airbus  consortium began  challenging the 
American  dominated  aircraft  industry.  By  the  mid-1980s,  Airbus  had  become  a 
recognised player on the world commercial aircraft market. As a consequence, by the 
late 1980s, Boeing began  to  look to  design a new aircraft that would fill  needs that 
planes like its 747 and  767 did not. More  specific, Boeing needed to fill a "gap" with 
respect  to  seating  capacity  and  range  of  its  commercial  jets  keeping  in  mind 
economic development in  the Pacific Rim  area.  The  company needed a large body 
aircraft able to cover distance ranges between 7,000 and 8,000 nautical miles. 
At first Boeing thought of  stretching the  existing  767 design. This would  be a safe, 
quick and low-cost way of providing a plane with  an  increased seat capacity.  In  the 
meantime, though, both  McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus were expected to  offer new 
large  capacity,  long  range  aircraft.  With  such  competition  in  view,  Boeing  decided 
that it would be  better to  develop a plane  that could  compete  in  a more  direct way 
with  the  new competition. After United Airlines provided a firm "base  load" order for 
the new plane, Boeing was able to launch its 777 design in the second half of 1990. 
In  order to  better the "fit" between form  and context,  Boeing  invited eight airlines to 
get involved with the  design of the 777 in  the  early conceptual design phase,  when 
little of the design parameter space was firmly decided upon. This allowed for taking 
into account customer requirements. Although eight airlines had to agree upon some 
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work toward a consensus with  them  that enabled  its  engineers  to  arrive at  a solid 
basis for more detailed engineering work. 
3.2. Designing a plane 
In traditional aircraft design, many engineers and draftspersons work individually and 
in  team  on  various  parts  and  subsystems  of  the  plane.  As  explained  in  detail  by 
Petroski (1996), there were over 130,000 unique individual parts to be engineered in 
the  777,  and  when  rivets  and  other fasteners  were  counted,  over 3,000,000  parts 
were to be assembled in each plane.  The 747, which had  a total of 4,500,000 parts, 
required about 75,000 individual drawings to  specify. This great number of drawings 
all  had to be internally consistent if  the  various parts and  subassemblies were to  fit. 
This required a lot of interface work between engineers. Whenever a design change 
occurred, all drawings had to be checked in  order to assess its  impact and  to adapt 
the existing design to the new one. This obviously was a slow and tedious process. 
Even with lots of checking,  cross-checking, and double-checking, human error could 
never be totally excluded and as a consequence, mismatches occurred frequently.  In 
order  to  trace  incompatibilities  across  parts,  subsystems  and  systems,  physical 
prototypes were built. This approach was of course expensive and  time-consuming. 
In the past, Boeing had tried to minimise these problems through an intensive quality 
management approach  emphasising the  need for intensive co-operation throughout 
the design process. 
In  order to  remedy  the  aforementioned  drawbacks,  Boeing  opted  for  a  paperless 
design  of  the  777.  Computers  would  be  used  in  the  design,  testing  and 
manufacturing process to a greater extent than ever before. Three-dimensional CAD 
systems would prove to be the solution to this challenge, enabling Boeing to achieve 
maximum concurrency during  the  design  of  the  new  plane  while  at the  same time 
aiming at a high-quality robust design. 
Boeing already developed some experience with  CAD when  designing engine parts 
of  the  767.  Both  from  a cost  and  throughput time  perspective,  the  CAD approach 
proved  a  significant  improvement  over  the  traditional  "drawing"  and  "interfacing" 
approach.  Also,  Boeing  had  experienced  a  sharp  decline  in  Engineering  Change 
Orders once the 767 CAD designs were released. The CAD system used during this 
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developed by the French software firm Dassault Systemes. 
In  order to be useful for the design of the  777,  the  CATIA system  had to  be  scaled-
up, which was in itself a major engineering effort. Just some numbers to illustrate the 
task at hand. Total storage capacity for the overall system reached 3.5 terabytes (the 
equivalent of 2,500,000 million 3.5-inch high-density disks). As  many as 238 teams, 
including  up  to  40  engineers,  were  involved  in  the  design,  development  and 
manufacturing of the 777. All engineers needed access to  all of the computer data. A 
paperless design meant that instead of waiting for drawings, any engineer working on 
any part or subassembly could call up all connected parts and subassemblies on any 
library of the 7,000 workstations that were scattered across 17 time zones. In order to 
make this possible, Boeing laid dedicated data lines across the Pacific Ocean. About 
20  percent  of  the  fuselage  structure  was  being  designed  and  developed  by  a 
consortium  of  Japanese  partners  including  Fuji,  Kawasaki  and  Mitsubishi  Heavy 
Industries.  Their  engineers  had  to  be  logged  into  the  worldwide  777-workstation 
network. 
Via  an  electronic pre-assembly  program,  interference  between  parts  and  systems 
was continuously identified. To be  sure that the  newly developed  CAD-system was 
itself reliable, an integrated prototyping strategy was developed. As soon as possible, 
physical prototypes of aircraft subsystems were developed that allowed checking the 
design  rules that  rolled  out of  the  CATIA system.  In  addition,  Boeing  developed  a 
simulated mechanic, CATIA-man, who could be  manipulated to  crawl  around  inside 
the  assembled  digital  plane  to  check  manoeuvrability  during  construction  and 
maintenance operations. 
3.3. The design revolution 
The Boeing example clearly illustrates the fundamental change in the design process 
that began in the  United States during the  1980s. This change was brought about as 
the result of several pressures, including: 
•  market pressures due to globalisation trends, 
•  decreasing lifecycles of consumer products and high-tech products, 
•  the need to shorten product development times, 
23 •  the need to improve product quality and, 
•  the  need  to  improve  communication  between  design  and  development 
engineering  on  the  one  hand,  and  manufacturing  and  customer-centred 
marketing on the other hand. 
A  major  theme  underlying  all  these  pressures  often  is  an  obsession  with  the 
customer,  as  nicely  described  in  Treacy  and  Wiersema's  best-selling  book  "The 
Discipline of Market Leaders" (1996). This customer intimacy requires new modes of 
organisation,  new  design  methods  and  new  design  technologies  that  enable 
concurrency,  overlap  and  co-realisation  of  the  new  product  in  an  intimate  co-
operation between internal departments at the company and customers or suppliers. 
As  a consequence, the  keyword for the  design  revolution  we  witness  at  present is 
improved communications. 
These improved communications, and the "virtual" and  "physical" visualisations that 
accompany  them  because  of  the  three-dimensional  parametric  character  of  most 
new design technologies  Oust  think  about  CATIA-man},  are  ideal  vehicles  to  help 
reduce  both  the  ambiguity  and  the  uncertainty  that  underlay  all  new  product 
development trajectories. This is  possible because of  the potentially "rich" character 
of  the information that becomes available via  the  use  of  the  3D  technologies,  thus 
benefiting  the  reduction  of  information  as  well  as  interpretation  asymmetries. 
Moreover,  as  argued  earlier,  these  technologies  can  be  at  the  centre  of  the 
development and management of fast experimentation strategies that result in  highly 
effective cycles of design-build-test-redesign that are crucial in fitting product form  to 
its context of use (Debackere,  1998; Loch & Terwiesch, 1998; Thomke,  1997). This, 
of  course,  brings  us  to  the  need  to  define  the  new  design  environment  that  fits 
today's innovation imperatives. 
4.  The new design environment: organisation, methodology and technology 
Design  technologies  have  occurred  in  many  different  application  areas.  Although 
their history and variety is most well established in mechanical applications, they start 
making  significant inroads into other areas as  well  (e.g.  rational  or structured drug 
design and molecular modelling in pharmaceuticals, simulation and testing of circuitry 
in electronics). In this section, we reflect on the benefits and the pitfalls in  introducing 
this new design environment. 
24 As  explained  previously  in  Figure  1,  new  design  technologies  are  one  of  various 
central  components  that  are  at  the  core  of  determining  innovation  performance. 
These  design  technologies,  as  illustrated  in  the  Boeing  case,  have  as  unique 
attributes their potential information  richness because of the 3D (visual) character of 
the information they provide as  well  as  their contribution  to  quick cycle  experiential 
development  strategies  since  they  allow  for  fast  iterations  of  analysis  and 
experimentation. Without going into detail on  the  huge variety of design technologies 
available today,  I just want to  mention  their increasing  inroads along and across all 
functional areas that intervene during an  innovation effort, from product design over 
prototype creation to rapid development of process tooling. 
4.1. A collection of technologies 
In the engineering literature, the amount of information and evidence on  the potential 
impact and the use of new design technologies are tremendous (e.g.  Ertas & Jones, 
1996; Jayaram, 1995; McMahon & Browne, 1993; Van der Schueren & Kruth,  1996). 
In  this  brief  summary,  I  just  want  to  highlight  some  of  the  major  features  and 
characteristics of those technologies, without of course entering into all the technical 
details of the tools and techniques involved. 
First  of all,  the  advent and the  presence of  analytical  techniques that allow for 3D 
visual  representations  and  simulations  of  product  concepts  linked  to  such 
calculations  as  kinematic  modelling,  dynamic  modelling,  stress  modelling  and 
thermal modelling has a direct impact on the  product design phase of the  innovation 
process.  One  of  the  basic  mathematical  techniques  supporting  this  evolution  has 
been  Finite Element Analysis.  It  has become the primary tool  in  stress analysis and 
structural  dynamics,  and  the  ability  to  adapt  it  for  use  with  CAD  has  contributed 
greatly  to  the  proliferation  of  CAD  systems  in  industry.  Because  of  its  parametric 
character,  Finite  Element  Analysis  can  be  used  in  analysing  designs  involving 
varying  geometric shapes as  well  as non-homogeneous materials.  It  also  provides 
considerable flexibility in the setting of loading and  support conditions. It is also used 
in  the  solution of heat transfer problems and the  analysis of fluid flow and  electrical 
and magnetic fields. 
Although 2D draftings continue to  be  the  most widely used  CAD  application,  many 
manufacturing  firms  have  chosen  to  shift  to  solid  3D  modelling.  Solid  modelling 
provides a complete geometric and mathematical description of part geometry, which 
25 is  important if  the  model  is  to  be  used for design analysis,  simulation,  generation of 
mass properties, or for developing  NC  (numerically controlled) data  to  machine the 
part.  Thanks to advances  in  hardware  and  software,  it  is  now  possible  to  use 3D 
representations  instead  of  20  or  2.50,  or  wireframe  models.  The  2.50 
representations are 20 renderings that include thickness data for some regions of the 
20 part. Unlike surface representations that use points, lines, and CUNes to define an 
object,  solid  modelling  uses  elements  such  as  boxes,  cones,  cylinders  and 
manipulated  20 shapes  to  generate  models.  The  IGES  standard  (Initial  Graphics 
Exchange Standard) allows 20 systems to transfer data between different vendors. 
Solid  modelling can  be  used for various  purposes,  such  as creating  realistic  visual 
displays,  analysing  the  motion  of  components  (including  interference  with  other 
elements,  see  for  instance  the  Boeing  example),  and  structural  analysis.  The 
greatest  advantage  that  solid  models  offer  over  surface  models  is  enhanced 
integration of design and manufacturing. 
A few examples of Computer Aided Design (CAD) and  Computer Aided Engineering 
(CAE) tools are AutoCad®, ProEngineer®, PTModeller®, ProMechanica®, CATIA®, 
Unigraphics® or Mentor Graphics® (in  the case of electronic designs). They can  be 
directly linked to, for instance, product data management tools such as CAOIM® that 
allow for building complete  libraries of  the product's design hierarchy that can then 
become available to manufacturing and operations, for instance as Bill-of-Materials. 
Second,  a  variety  of  physical  techniques  allow  for  the  rapid  development  of  3D 
physical  prototypes and  tools.  For instance, just to  name a few,  stereolithography, 
selective  laser sintering, laminated object modelling and manufacturing, holographic 
interference solidification, photochemical machining, selective area  laser deposition, 
selective  metal  powder  sintering,  fused  deposition  modelling,  multiphase  jet 
solidification,  ballistic  particle  manufacturing,  direct  shell  production  casting,  etc. 
Rapid prototyping (and tooling) techniques thus produce physical models from CAD 
data either by material layer deposition or (also increasingly today) by material layer 
removal. 
Most rapid prototyping systems electronically divide a 3D CAD model of the part into 
thin  horizontal cross-sections and  then  transform  the  design,  layer  by  layer,  into  a 
physical  model.  Rapid  prototyping  (and  tooling)  techniques  are  increasingly  being 
used during the product development cycle. For instance, Ford Motor Company uses 
26 stereolithography  as  an  integral  part  of  concurrent  product  and  process  design. 
Developing  new  automobile  components  is  expensive,  traditionally  requiring  many 
design  iterations  and  significant  schedule  time.  Stereolithography  allows  the 
production of models of the part in a single day, using the same CAD data needed for 
structural analysis,  kinematic studies,  NC  programming, etc.  An  example of  the use 
of  this  technology  occurred  when  Ford  sought  a  supplier  for  a  newly  designed 
internal  combustion  engine  rocker  arm.  When  different suppliers  had  difficulties  in 
interpreting the 20 drawings of  the  rocker arm,  Ford  turned to  stereolithography to 
produce  a  model  of  the  part  in  one  day.  When  the  model  was  made  available  to 
bidders Ford received a quote that saved up to 3 million  US$ annually in  production 
costs. 
Although  rapid  prototyping  and  tooling  technologies  are  evolving  at  great  speed, 
there are of course still limitations as to their use. These include limitations due to the 
use  of  rapid  prototype  materials  different  from  those  specified  for  the  part  being 
designed,  restrictions  on  the  number  and  variety  of  test  conditions  that  can  be 
applied  to  the  prototype,  and  difficulty  in  using  test  data  from  the  prototype  in 
performing  Finite  Element Analysis.  In  addition,  even  if  the  tools  are  available,  our 
own research shows that it takes some time and change of mindset before designers 
and engineers are able to make the switch to the new design approach. Training and 
developing familiarity with the new tools is crucial. However, even  when training and 
guidance are provided,  it takes time  before  the  tools are being  used  in  an  effective 
and  an  efficient manner.  Moreover,  it  is  obvious that the  introduction  of  those  new 
design tools may have a quite disruptive impact on the "established" design expertise 
and experience at the company. As a consequence, "Not Invented Here" syndromes 
and  resistance to change phenomena may well  occur and  may thus put a strain  on 
the deployment of the new tools and techniques. 
To  conclude  this  brief  overview,  virtual  prototyping  is  a  term  that  describes  the 
computer analysis  and  testing  of  CAD  models  before the  commitment  is  made  to 
produce the physical prototype.  In virtual prototyping the CAD model is  evaluated by 
iterative dynamic simulation before making the physical model. This technique allows 
testing of the  model under various  kinematic and  dynamic conditions that would  be 
expensive and complex to duplicate in the laboratory. 
These last reflections suggest that the use of virtual and physical prototyping should 
be  intertwined  and  integrated.  In  our  recent  research,  we  therefore  are  now 
27 attempting at establishing a model for the design  of "optimal  prototyping strategies" 
as an  integral part of the experimentation and analysis strategy used during the new 
product design process. These optimal prototyping strategies aim at using virtual and 
physical  prototyping  in  an  intermittent and  iterative  manner in  order to  arrive  at an 
intelligent experimental program.  In  this way, the organisation of the design process 
becomes a rapid sequence of design-build-test-redesign cycles. The "build" phase of 
the cycle then uses the prototyping approach that offers most added value in terms of 
design changes and improvements (or for that matter, elimination of design errors) at 
any moment during the design process. 
Figure 2:  Impact of new design technologies on Engineering Change Order patterns at one 












28 In  one  of the companies that participated  in  this  research,  the  development of such 
an experiential prototyping strategy has been called the 4-step FMEA (Failure Mode 
and  Effect Analysis)  process during  product design.  In  this  4-step  FMEA  process, 
drawings,  3D  CAD  models and  simulations,  and  physical  prototypes  are  used  and 
integrated in a concurrent design process. The intermittent use of virtual and physical 
models  allows  maximising  the  elimination  of  design  errors,  both  from  a  product 
functional  design  perspective  and  from  a  process  engineering  perspective.  The 
results  of  this  integrated  experiential  prototyping  strategy  have  proved  to  be  quite 
significant. In  Figure 2, for instance, a summary overview of the evolution in  number 
of  Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) shows  the  drastic improvement realised via 
the introduction of virtual and physical prototyping strategies during the 4-step FMEA 
process. The traditional approach did not use this "intelligent" intermittent deployment 
of the various design technologies discussed above. 
Finally,  in  Tables 3 and  4,  some  empirical  results  on  the  impact of the  use of  new 
design technologies on innovation performance indicators are presented. The impact 
on design and development capacity, cost and throughput time is obvious. 
Table 3:  The impact of 3D CAD technologies on transformer design (Debackere, 1998) 
Performance Indicators  "Traditional" design  "New" design environment 
environment (spreadsheet  (3D CAD with integrated 
calculations and 2D CADi  electromagnetic calculations) 
Average calculation time per  110 hours  15 hours 
transformer 
Average drawing time per  400 hours  210 hours 
transformer 
Other activities  160 hours  100 hours 
Total yearly capacity in design 
department for 280 transformers  65  33 
totalling 9109 MVA 
However, the  results obtained  by  Stefan  Thomke  (see  Table  4,  1997) still  point to 
another  phenomenon  that  was  also  observed  already  by  Eisenhardt  and  Tabrizi 
(1995).  In  his  research,  Thomke  compares  the  use  of  Electronically  Programmed 
Logic Devices (EPLDs) to Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) during the 
design  and  development  phase  in  IC  design.  While  ASIC  technology  has  been 
available  to  designers  for  more  than  a  decade,  EPLDs  are  a  relatively  new 
technology.  They were invented  in  the  late  1980s and  have  rapidly improved  since 
then. 
29 Table 4: The impact of new prototyping technology on  IC development (based on Thomke,  1997) 
Process Indicator  EPLD design  ASIC design  p-value 
technology  technology 
(47 projects)  (31  projects) 
Number of prototype iterations  14  1.5  < 0.001 
Throughput time  8 months  18 months  < 0.01 
Cost of prototype change  Less than 100$  More than 10,000$  ---
Time required to change prototype  Less than 1 day  More than 1 week  ---
As  is  evident from  Table  4,  the  use  of  EPLDs  does  not  only  lead  to  a  significant 
improvement  in  innovation  performance.  But,  it  also  enables  the  designers  to 
dramatically increase the number of prototypes used during an innovation project (up 
to 14 prototype iterations instead of an  average of  1.5 for ASIC  design technology). 
This puts a  strain  on  "traditional"  phased  project planning  approaches as  it almost 
becomes  impossible  to  have  detailed  milestone  planning  and  reviews  in  this  fast 
prototype  design  and  change  cycle  approach.  In  other  words,  the  "traditional" 
(phased and planned) project organisation format is  being replaced  here by a more 
adaptive  approach.  This  adaptive  approach  allows  for  a  quick  sequence  of 
experimentation  and  analysis  cycles,  as  extensively  described  in  the  previous 
sections  of  this  paper.  Eisenhardt  and  Tabrizi  (1995)  coined  this  organisational 
approach as "experiential project structures." 
4.2. The Integrated Design Capability 
By  now,  it  has become  obvious that companies  that  want  to  deploy  innovation  in 
support of their competitive position might consider investing in an  Integrated Design 
Capability  that  supports  a  fast-cycle  design  process.  This  Integrated  Design 
Capability  "fuses"  organisational  approaches  (traditional  and  experiential  project 
structures, competence versus project organisation in  the innovation matrix),  design 
methodologies  (such  as  Quality  Function  Deployment)  and  the  aforementioned 
design  technologies  into  one  consistent  support  infrastructure  for  a  company's 
innovation  process.  This,  of  course,  implies  a  serious  investment  and  hence, 
becomes  a  strategic decision for  the  organisation.  It  also  implies  a clear  strategic 
choice toward which market segments and application areas the company decides to 
turn  its  innovation  attention.  This  is  mainly  because  investments  in  design 
30 technologies  are  not  completely  application-independent,  as  illustrated  with  the 
arguments and discussions in the previous sections. 
The Dutch steel and aluminium company, Koninklijke Hoogovens, has developed two 
Integrated Design Centres over the last years: the Centre for Packaging Technology 
and the  Centre for Product Applications in Transport and Building Applications. Each 
of  those  centres  creates  and  sustains  an  environment  in  which  appropriate 
organisational approaches, combined with a set of design methods and techniques, 
are geared toward an effective and efficient innovation process. 
To conclude,  in  Table 5,  I present some of our recent research  results that illustrate 
how various  dimensions  of  an  Integrated  Design  Capability  influence  one  specific 
innovation  process performance  indicator,  namely  the  smooth  introduction  of  new 
product designs into manufacturing operations. The statistical analyses reported  are 
based on an extensive questionnaire and interview survey of 103 innovation projects 
at Flemish companies over the period 1996-1997, with  special attention being paid to 
the organisation of the interface between design and manufacturing. 
As is obvious from the four regression models discussed in Table 5, 
•  communication (both formal and informal), 
•  and the degrees of freedom for experimentation and learning, 
•  and the organisation of the innovation process, 
•  and the use of new design technologies 
all  have  a  significant  and  positive  impact  on  the  process  performance  indicator 
analysed.  These  empirical  results  therefore  provide  further  corroboration  for  the 
examples,  arguments  and  hypotheses  developed  in  the  various  sections  of  this 
paper. 
31 Table 5:  Regression  results  explaining the  performance  of  introducing new product 
designs into  manufacturing  operations  (based  on  Debackere,  Vandevelde, 
Van Dierdonck, 1998) 
Dependent Variable = 
Smooth introduction of new product designs into manufacturing operations 
(D.V. based on survey scale, range 0 (not smooth at all) -to- 10 (extremely smooth» 
(Survey of N=103 new product development projects) 
Modell: 
D.V. = 9.50 + 0.64 x (use of design technologies) - 0.70 x (level of task complexity) 
Adj. R2 = 0.25, p-value model < 0.001, b-coefficients significant at .05-level or below. 
Independent variables were the result of factor analyses and multiple item  scales. 
They are always coded from low to high. 
D.V. = 8.35 +  8.34 x  (intensity of informal communication between design, development and 
manufacturing) 
+  0.72 x  (intensity of written, formal communication between design, development 
and manufacturing) 
0.45 x  (level of task complexity) 
Adj. R2 = 0.32, p-value model < 0.001, b-coefficients significant at .05-level or below. 
Independent variables were the result of factor analyses and multiple item  scales. 
They are always coded from low to high. 
D.V. = 6.62 +  1.10 x  (degree of formal organisation during design and development process) 
+  0.67 x  (organisational involvement of developers during manufacturing ramp-up) 
+  0.84 x  (formal planning and execution of pilot runs and prototype testing) 
Adj. R2 = 0.39, p-value model < 0.001, b-coefficients significant at .05-level or below. 
Independent variables were the result of factor analyses and multiple item  scales. 
They are always coded from low to high. 
Model IV: 
D.V. = 6.74 +  1.15 x  (familiarity of product developers with manufacturing operations) 
+  0.50 x  (room for experimentation and learning during design and development) 
Adj. R2 = 0.27, p-value model < 0.001, b-coefficients significant at .05-level or below. 
Independent variables were the result of factor analyses and multiple item scales. 
They are always coded from low to high. 
32 5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted at providing an insight into the major components of 
the "new" integrated design environment that companies can  deploy to support their 
innovation  process.  Core  concepts  that  have  been  discussed  in  support  of  our 
arguments in favour of  the  integration of  new design technologies into a systematic 
approach  of  the  innovation  process  were  ambiguity,  uncertainty  and  learning  via 
experimentation  and  analysis.  Of  course,  as  argued,  implementing  an  Integrated 
Design Capability is not without difficulties and problems. 
As mentioned, introducing an integrated design capability in  an organisation  may be 
quite  disruptive  with  respect  to  the  design  expertise  and  experience  currently 
available. However, the new design environment also allows for a more adaptive and 
responsive  interpretation  of  the  "traditional"  (phased  and  planned)  project 
management structures that have been deployed in innovation contexts in the past. 
To conclude,  in  Table  6,  a detailed summary on  the  organisational,  methodological 
and technological components of an Integrated Design Capability is provided. 
33 Table 6: The Consensus Set of  56  "Best Practices" by Category (ASME Council  on 
Education, 1995) during the Product Realisation Process (PRP) 
Knowledge of  PRP team skills  Design skills  Analysis &  Manufacturing 
PRP  testing skills  skills 
1.  Knowledge of  7.  Project  18.  Competitive  36.  Finite elements  50.  Materials 
product  management  analysis  analysis  planning 
realisation  tools  19.  Creative  37.  Design of  inventory 
process  8.  Budgeting  thinking  experiments  51.  Total quality 
2.  Bench marking  9.  Project risk  20.  Tools for  38.  Value  management 
3.  Concurrent  analysis  "customer- engineering  52.  Manufacturing 
engineering  10.  Design reviews  centred" design  39.  Mechatronics  process 
4.  Corporate  11.  Information 
(QFD-HoQ)  (mechanisms  53.  Manufacturing 
vision and  processing  21.  Solid  and controls)  floor! work cell 
product fit 
12.  Communication 
modelling!  40.  Process  layout 
5.  Interface with  rapid  improvement  54.  Robotics and 
other business  13.  Sketching!  prototyping and  tools  automated 
functions  drawing  tooling systems 
41.  Statistical  assembly 
(marketing,  14.  Leadership  22.  Systems  process control  55.  Computer-
intellectual  15.  Conflict  perspective 
42.  Design  integrated 
property &  management  23.  Design for  standards (e.g.  manufacturing 
legal, ...  ) 
16.  Professional  assembly  UL, ASME,  56.  Electro-
6.  Industrial  ethics  24.  Design for  IEC, ANSI)  mechanical 
design 
17.  Teams!  commonality  43.  Testing  packaging 
teamwork  platform  standards (e.g. 
25.  Design for cost  ASTM) 
26.  Design for  44.  Process 
disassembly  standards (e.g. 
27.  Design for  ISO 9000, 
environment  AQAP) 
28.  Design for  45.  Product testing 
ergonomics  46.  Physical testing 
(human factors)  47.  Test equipment 
29.  Design for  48.  Application of 
manufacturing  statistics 
30.  Design for  49.  Reliability 
performance 
31.  Design for 
reliability 
32.  Design for 
safety 
33.  Design for 
service!repair 
34.  CAD systems 
(2D & 3D) 
35.  Geometric 
tolerancing 
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